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Times May Have Changed, but the Song is Still
the Same –
Why the Supreme Court was Incorrect to Stray
from Sony’s Reasoning in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
By Julie A. Wooten*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Grokster, Ltd. (“Grokster”) is dead, for now. As of Monday, November 7, 2005,1
Grokster’s website, which had been used to distribute file-sharing software, has been
officially shut down and displays the following disclaimer:
The United States Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that using this
service to trade copyrighted material is illegal. Copying copyrighted
motion picture and music files using unauthorized peer-to-peer services is
illegal and is prosecuted by copyright owners. There are legal services for
downloading music and movies. This service is not one of them.
Grokster hopes to have a safe and legal service available soon.2

¶2

¶3

This sentiment, proffered by Grokster, is the result of a settlement agreement3
stemming from the July 2005 Supreme Court decision of MGM v. Grokster.4 This
decision marks an unfortunate turn of events for the myriad individuals who used this
service for peer-to-peer file sharing, and the thousands who used this technology for the
transfer of files, both copyrighted and non-copyrighted.
This Note will discuss how the Supreme Court misinterpreted and misapplied its
previous decision of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.5 in its opinion in Grokster
III. In Part I, this note will present background on copyright law and a brief history of
key file sharing cases. Part II will discuss the application of Sony’s reasoning in the

*
Julie Wooten is a 2007 Juris Doctor candidate at Northwestern University School of Law. She received
her Bachelor of Science degree from California State University, Fresno, and is a candidate for a Master of
Public Health from University of California, Los Angeles.
1
Ted Bridis, Grokster Downloading Service Shuts Down, TMCNET, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://news.tmcnet.com/news/2005/nov/1201939.htm.
2 Grokster Home Page, http://www.grokster.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
3
Bridis, supra note 1.
4
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
5
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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lower court decisions, namely at the Federal Appellate level was indeed the appropriate
application of this precedent. Part III will argue that the application of the Sony Doctrine
to peer-to-peer file sharing was appropriate and that the divergence the Supreme Court
created with the “active inducement” test was unnecessary. Part IV will conclude that the
Supreme Court decision in Grokster III is fraught with potential negative effects on
technological development and difficulties that may arise within intellectual property
legal practice.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: COPYRIGHT LAW & FILE-SHARING CASES
A. Copyright Protection
¶4

¶5

Copyright protection is available to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression . . . .”6 including sound recordings, musical works, and
motion pictures.7 When anyone violates an exclusive right of the copyright owner, a
copyright is infringed.8 In file sharing cases the issue of direct infringement is not one of
great significance and is essentially conceded due to the fact that some, if not most file
sharing networks involve unauthorized replication of copyrighted works.9 Because the
number of individual users is great, the copyright holders tend to go after the software
distributors, or providers of the peer-to-peer file sharing networks, rather than the
individual users themselves.10
Traditionally, copyright infringement liability has not been restricted to direct
infringers.11 Two theories of secondary liability have developed in the courts. The first is
a theory developed out of the doctrine respondeat superior, the principle of vicarious
liability.12 The principle of contributory liability, by contrast, developed out of the
common law tort doctrine that if one contributes to the tort of another he should be
responsible for the tortious action.13 Although not expressly mentioned in the 1976

6

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
Id. at § 102(a)(2), (6), (7). Virtually any type of file can be shared via peer-to-peer file sharing networks.
Files containing copyrighted music and movies are the most problematic types that are traded. Anna E.
Engelmann & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2004).
Broadband technology, where a person’s computer is always connected to the Internet, has made the ability
to download an entire movie commonplace. Id. at 34.
8
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
9
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating
that violation of copyright by illegal exchange of files is not seriously contested).
10
See, e.g., Motown Record Co., L.P. v. iMesh.Com, Inc, No. 03 Civ. 7339(PKC), 2004 WL 503720, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alleging that 23 million users worldwide use iMesh file sharing software); In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (seeking an injunction to prevent
contributory and vicarious infringement on defendant’s file-sharing system).
11
Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age
of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 868 (2004).
12
See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auctions, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996). Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, an employer is responsible for the torts of its employees. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting the “agency rule of respondeat superior
applies to copyright infringement by a servant within the scope of his employment”).
13
Id. at 264.
7
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Copyright Act,14 both vicarious and contributory liability are recognized by Congress in
the legislative history.15
Vicarious liability is found in the absence of an employer-employee relationship if
a party has “the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity [of the direct
infringer] and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”16 Contributory
infringement occurs when “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . .”17
B. Post-Sony Cases Involving File-Sharing
1. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

¶7

¶8

Two Federal Appellate courts have applied the Sony doctrine18 specifically to peerto-peer networks and file sharing in recent years, Napster and In re Aimster.19 The Ninth
Circuit addressed peer-to-peer file-sharing networks and their relationship to copyright
infringement in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.20 The suit was brought by a group of
recording studios engaged in the distribution and recording of music.21 The plaintiffs
claimed that Napster was liable for copyright infringement that was taking place on its
network when users of the Napster software swapped copyrighted music in the form of
MP3 files.22
The Ninth Circuit examined whether Napster should be held liable under either
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement after it was determined that a fair use
defense was unavailable.23 The court found that Napster had knowledge – both actual
and constructive – of the copyright infringement occurring on the network.24 In the
district court case, it was reported that the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) had informed Napster of over 12,000 copyrighted files on its servers.25 The court
of appeals revisited and reconsidered this data.26 Napster designed its network to
facilitate both individual users storing copies of the copyrighted materials on their
14

17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61, 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674, 5775. The
committee noted, while discussing contributory infringement that “[t]he exclusive rights accorded to a
copyright owner under section 106 are ‘to do and to authorize’ any of the activities specified in the five
numbered clauses. Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions to the liability of the
contributory infringers.” Id. at 61. In denying an amendment to the copyright statute to exempt owners of
an establishment for the infringement of an independent contractor, the committee stated that vicarious
liability was a “well-established principle of copyright law” and concluded, “no justification exists for
changing the existing law . . . .” Id. at 159-60.
16
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
17
See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
18
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19
Todd C. Chapman, Note, Sharing in the Groove: Ninth Circuit Allows Peer-to-Peer Networks to
Continue File-Sharing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), 4 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 304, 307 (2005).
20
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
21
Id. at 1010-11.
22
Id. at 1014.
23
Id. at 1019-22.
24
Id. at 1020.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1020.
15
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personal computers, and Napster simultaneously maintained a central server containing
available song titles.27 Because of this central index, Napster was able to monitor and
control the content and if the index were to be removed, users would not have had any
access to download or exchange copyrighted music files.28
The Napster software design differs greatly from the software created by
Grokster, which did not include a central server and thus did not allow for much control
over the content individual users were sharing.29 The Ninth Circuit supported the district
court’s finding that since Napster could have blocked the exchange of copyrighted
materials on its network, and chose not to, it was materially contributing to the
infringement taking place on its network.30 The district court’s injunction was upheld and
Napster was prevented from sharing the plaintiff’s copyrighted music.31 Since this
decision, Napster has halted its previous peer-to-peer service, and is now a commercial
MP3 downloading service that offers both subscription and “a la carte” services for
digital music downloads.32
2. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1107 (2004).

¶10

In 2003, the Seventh Circuit also addressed peer-to-peer file sharing when it
decided In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.33 The plaintiffs in Aimster, like those in
Napster, were music producers and recording companies who sought to halt the digital
sharing of their copyrighted materials over the Internet.34 Aimster’s system used a
network, which allowed users to exchange files via America Online (AOL) instantmessaging system. The service provided a searchable database of compiled user
information, but did not make copies of the shared files.35
¶11
The Seventh Circuit found that because copies of actual songs did not reside on its
server, Aimster was “not a direct infringer of the copyrights on those songs.”36 Using the
Sony doctrine, the Seventh Circuit next looked at whether the Aimster network had
“substantial non-infringing uses.”37 Aimster could not provide solid evidence that the
service had substantial non-infringing uses, but only that it had the potential to do so.38
The court rejected Aimster’s attempt to escape liability for contributory infringement
when Aimster knew that the services’ principal use was infringing, stating it would be an
“extreme result” of the Sony decision.39 Beyond the fact that Aimster could not show
non-infringing usage, the court took issue with the fact that the site had a tutorial for
27

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1022.
29
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004).
30
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
31
Id. at 1029.
32
See Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). See also June M. Besek,
Understanding Basic Copyright Law 2005: Music on the Internet, 838 PLI/Pat 263, 272 (July 2005).
33
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
34
Id. at 645.
35
Id. at 646.
36
Id. at 647.
37
Id. at 648.
38
Id. at 653.
39
Id. at 651.
28
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users teaching them how to download copyrighted music.40 The court in Aimster
described this tutorial as “the invitation to infringement that the Supreme Court found
was missing in Sony.”41 Resolving that the record industry would suffer “irreparable
harm,” the court of appeals upheld the preliminary injunction ordered by the district
court.42
III. EXPOSITION OF MGM STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.
A. Facts
¶12

In 2001, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) along with several music and motion
picture studios brought suit against Grokster43 and StreamCast Networks, Inc.
(“StreamCast”) (jointly, the “Software Distributors”) companies that allow individual
users to connect to a peer-to-peer network and download digital media free of charge
over the Internet.44 The Software Distributors’ own servers allow for the downloading of
programs, which are in turn installed on the user’s computer.45 Users are then able to use
the software by connecting to the network searching for songs or other digital content
shared by other users. These are peer-to-peer networks because “users’ computers
communicate directly with each other, not through central servers.”46 Once the digital
media has been located on a “peer’s” computer, the user can create a personal copy.47
¶13
MGM, et al., which is comprised of organizations in the music recording and
motion picture production industries (“the Copyright Holders”), alleged that Grokster
was guilty of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement for distributing this peerto-peer file-sharing software. The Copyright Holders sought a prospective injunction
against the Software Distributors for copyright infringement.48 In its original complaint,
MGM, et al. provided research, which revealed that approximately ninety percent of the
material exchanged using Grokster’s file sharing software was copyrighted material.49
Further, they claimed that copyright infringement occurred every time users exchange
information.50 The complaint further claimed that Grokster contributed to this continuing
copyright infringement by creating and making available to the public the file-sharing
software, and that Grokster was, therefore a contributory infringer.51 The United States
District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id. at 655.
43
Jason Krause, Grokster Ruling Means Change: Supporters Must Rethink Use of File-Sharing Programs,
2005 No. 26 A.B.A. Journal E-Report 5.
44
Matthew J. Rust, Note, Nobody Uses Betamax Anymore and Neither Should the Supreme Court: Why
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. Should Be Overturned, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 549,
552 (2005).
45
Id.
46
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).
47
Id.
48
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031, 1033-34 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
49
Id. at 1013.
50
Id.
51
Id.
41
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defendant Software Distributors,52 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed this decision.53 But in a landmark ruling, the lower court’s decision was
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court on June 27, 2005.54
B. The United States Court for the Central District of California
¶14

In this initial suit, the plaintiff Copyright Holders brought a claim against the
Software Distributors on the grounds of contributory infringement and vicarious
liability.55 The court held that the Software Distributors were not liable for contributory
infringement. In reaching this decision, the court opined that Distributors escaped
liability because there was no showing of material contribution to the infringement, even
though the court found that the Distributors had knowledge that their technology was
being used to infringe copyrights.56 Although the court additionally found that the
Software Distributors derived significant financial benefit from this service, the lack of
supervisory control over the infringing conduct made them exempt from vicarious
liability of the known copyright infringement.57
C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

¶15

The Ninth Circuit chose to uphold the summary judgment decision of the district
court when hearing the case on appeal.58 Here, the court again found that the Software
Distributors were neither vicariously liable nor were they contributory infringers.59 The
reasoning on both of these key points is summarized below.
¶16
On appeal the issue of vicarious liability hinged on the Software Distributors’
ability and right to supervise the users who were committing the infringement.60 Because
they are decentralized networks, both Grokster and StreamCast were able to avoid legal
responsibility. In a decentralized network architecture (also called peer-to-peernetwork), each user makes an index of all of his files available to other users in the
network.61 The peer-to-peer software then broadcasts requests from searches for
particular files to all computers in the network and results are returned to the requesting
computer.62
¶17
The court found that because neither file transfers, nor communication traveled
through the computers at StreamCast and Grokster, that they were unable to block
individual users or screen infringing material.63 This decision was in juxtaposition to the
Copyright Holders’ argument that claimed that the Software Distributors could alter the

52

Id. at 1031.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
54
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
55
Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
56
Id. at 1037, 1043.
57
Id. at 1043-45.
58
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.
59
Id. at 1158.
60
Id. at 1164-65.
61
Id. at 1159.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1165.
53
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software they circulated to prevent sharing of copyrighted material.64 Grokster’s inability
to regulate user’s communication and thus supervise the exchange of copyrighted
material was not enough to merit a finding of vicarious liability.65 Only if these
companies had been previously found guilty of vicarious liability, the court distinguished,
could they be held responsible for policing unlawful activity. The court upheld the
district court’s summary judgment determination on the issue of vicarious liability.66
¶18
The question of contributory infringement was also at issue when the case was
heard on appeal.67 Contributory infringement has two factors that are individually
determined: (1) the knowledge requirement and (2) the material contribution
requirement.68 The court applied the Sony doctrine to the knowledge requirement for
contributory infringement69 and followed the analysis it had developed in Napster.70 The
Software Distributors demonstrated that the software was capable of significant
noninfringing uses that were commercially viable.71 The copyright owners, in turn, were
asked to show that the Software Distributors failed to act on reasonable knowledge of
specific infringing usage. According to the court, the Software Distributors obtained
knowledge of the infringement after it occurred and thus, they were not actively
facilitating the infringement, as they could do nothing to stop the activities.72 For that
reason, the Software Distributors were entitled to summary judgment on the knowledge
component of contributory infringement.73 Utilizing comparable reasoning, the appellate
court also upheld summary judgment in favor of the Software Distributors on the issue of
material contribution to copyright infringement.74 The court found that it was not the
Software Distributors, but the users who created the network and provided access to the
forum where the infringing activity occurred.75 Thus, the court determined that there was
no knowledge of infringing activity and there was no material contribution, and
consequently the Software Distributors were not liable as contributory infringers.

64

Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1165-66.
66
Id. at 1166.
67
Id. at 1160.
68
Id. Note that the court here stated that there are three elements required to prove a defendant liable under
the theory of contributory copyright infringement; there are the two discussed above and a third, “direct
infringement by a primary infringer,” which the court stated was not at issue in this case.
69
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1157.
70
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d 284 F.3d 1091 (9th
Cir. 2002).
71
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161-62. To establish the software had substantial noninfringing used the
Software Distributors presented evidence that thousands of artists, including the band Wilco, had
authorized free distribution of their work, and that many public domain works were available on the
network. Id. at 1161.
72
Id. at 1162.
73
Id. at 1162-63.
74
Id. at 1163. Unlike Napster, the Software Distributors did not provide the “site and facilities” necessary
for the infringement. Id. This was again due to the fact that the Software Distributors did not provide
centralized servers or maintain indexes of files available on the network, as well as to the inability of the
Software Distributors to suspend user accounts. Id.
75
Id.
65
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D. The United States Supreme Court
¶19

The question presented to the Supreme Court was “under what circumstances the
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of
copyright infringement by third parties using the product.”76 The Court held that “one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”77 The Ninth Circuit decision was
vacated and remanded to comport with this holding.78
¶20
In his majority opinion, Justice Souter claims that both Grokster and StreamCast
had voiced the objective that users employ their software to download copyrighted
works, and that each took active steps to support infringement.79 Further, the Supreme
Court stated that StreamCast in particular capitalized on the demise of Napster, and went
to great lengths to gain favor with its former users.80
¶21
The Court also pointed to the fact that both Grokster and StreamCast, while not
making any direct revenue from the distribution of the software, did sell space to
advertisers so that they could stream promotions to users while they made use of their
software.81 Moreover, the Court said neither company made a significant effort to filter
or stop the sharing of copyrighted material.82 Because the above findings were so
compelling the Court chose to resolve this case on an inducement theory alone and forgo
further analysis on vicarious liability – a theory proposed by MGM.83 If the Court had
considered the vicarious liability theory put forth by the plaintiff they would have had to
make two distinct findings.84 First, that the Software Distributors were liable for
infringement because they had a right to supervise the direct infringer (even if there was
no knowledge of the infringement initially), and second, that they profited directly from
the infringement.85
¶22
The only recent Supreme Court case dealing with secondary copyright
infringement, prior to Grokster, was Sony.86 In Sony, the plaintiff’s claim stated that the
distribution alone of a commercial product capable of copyright infringement should
render the defendant secondarily liable for copyright infringement.87 Copyright holders
who claimed the company was liable for secondary copyright infringement sued Sony,
the manufacturer.88 The alleged infringement transpired when the VCR owners recorded
copyrighted programs.89 The district court found at trial that the primary use for the
machine was “time shifting” or taping a program for viewing at a later time, a use
76

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005).
Id. at 919.
78
Id. at 941.
79
Id. at 923-24.
80
Id. at 924.
81
Id. at 926.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 933-34.
84
Id. at 930.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 931.
87
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 420.
77
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deemed acceptable, fair, and noninfringing.90 Although Sony may not have had an
overtly stated objective to promote copying of copyrighted work, it did advertise, urging
consumers to purchase and use the VCR to “record favorite shows” or “build a library” of
recorded programs91 neither of which was seen as necessarily infringing.92 Still, because
the knowledge that copyrighted materials would be taped utilizing the Betamax, Sony
was still potentially liable for contributory infringement by selling the machine.93 But,
because the VCR was found to be “capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses,” the Supreme Court held the manufacturer could not be faulted solely on the basis
of its distribution.94
¶23
The Sony rule was created from an analysis based on patent law’s long-established
(but now defunct) article of commerce doctrine95 that “distribution of a component of a
patented device will not violate the patent if it is suitable for use in other ways.”96
Moreover, the staple article of the commerce doctrine holds that “[o]ne who makes and
sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination will be
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to intend
that they shall be used in the combination of the patent.”97 Therefore, “where an article is
‘good for nothing else’ but infringement there is no legitimate public interest in its
unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing intent to
infringe.”98 In opposition, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item
with substantial lawful and unlawful uses, and limits liability to occurrences of more
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.
This latitude leaves room for innovation and vital commerce.99
¶24
The key to resolving this rule in the Grokster case was in determining what it
means for a product to be “capable of significant noninfringing uses.”100 MGM argued
that because the percentage of infringing use outweighed that of noninfringing use that
this should not qualify as “substantial” noninfringing use, and the Supreme Court agreed
with this declaring that the Sony doctrine was misapplied at the appellate level.101 It
rather focused on the evidence of “active steps” taken to encourage infringement.102 The
Grokster Court also looked to the “inducement rule” which premises liability on
“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise

90

Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92
See id. at 456.
93
Id. at 439 (majority opinion).
94
Id. at 442.
95
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Note that this U.S. Patent Code section has since been deemed
unconstitutional. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
96
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005).
97
Id. (quoting New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452 (1915)).
98
Id. (quoting Canda v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)). See also Henry v.
A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
99
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
100
Id.
101
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933.
102
Id. at 936. (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
91
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legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.”103 It pointed to
evidence discovered about StreamCast that was obtained via internal communications
and advertising aimed at Napster users to show inducement.104
¶25
The Supreme Court in Grokster continued its analysis with a discussion of three
key features of evidence of intent.105 The first was that both companies preyed on the
then defunct Napster’s users.106 The second was that neither company made an attempt to
filter or stop the infringing activity.107 Lastly, they sold advertising space and promoted
high volume use, both which the court found to be unlawful objectives.108 Additionally,
the inducement theory requires that actual infringement occurred, and via MGM’s
showing, the evidence of infringement was on a “gigantic scale.”109 The Supreme Court
concluded by saying that Grokster is “significantly different from Sony” in that it showed
a purpose to profit from causing third-party acts of copyright infringement.110
IV. ANALYSIS
¶26

The Supreme Court in Grokster chose to diverge from the settled precedent of
Sony, a decision whose foundation rested on a theory of contributory liability.111 This
theory was simply that even if the manufacturer distributed a product knowing it was
going to be used in part for copyright infringement, liability could be overcome if the
product was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”.112 The Supreme
Court in Grokster III, by contrast, resolved its case on an inducement theory.113
¶27
Included in its discussion, akin to Sony, was the issue of commercially significant
noninfringing uses, but the opinion focused on intent as a key factor in determining
liability, stating: “that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement of third parties.”114 Justice
Souter claimed, as previously noted, that intent was proved by so-called promotion of the
infringement, via advertisements and no showing of an attempt to stop the
infringement.115 This evidence of intent was cumulatively deemed the active inducement
theory.116
¶28
It was unnecessary for the Court to have made the effort of creating a new test for
Grokster, as the facts presented fulfilled the requirements necessary to show
noninfringment created in the Sony doctrine, a determination that was made in both the

103

Id. at 937.
Id. at 937-38.
105
Id. at 939.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 939.
108
Id. at 939-40.
109
Id. at 940.
110
Id. at 941.
111
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
112
Id. at 442.
113
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 935.
116
See id. at 940-41.
104

360

Vol. 5:2]

Julie A. Wooten

district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals hearing of this case. In Sony, like
Grokster, the Court was considering potential copyright liability for a company that did
not itself infringe on the copyright, but only provided a mechanism that could be used to
do so. However, by contrast, Sony charged customers to buy the Betamax, whereas
Grokster provided this service for free. A buyer of the Sony Betamax could use the
machine for noninfringing purposes, such as taping a television program, one that was
either copyrighted or uncopyrighted, for later viewing.117 Sony, like Grokster and
StreamCast, also knew that its customers would use its product for unauthorized copying
or “library-building.”118 This fact was insufficient to make Sony itself an infringer.
¶29
The Sony Court recognized the need for a law fixing secondary copyright liability
to “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective – not
merely symbolic – protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others to freely
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”119 The Court also used the patent
law doctrine that establishes that a manufacturer is not liable if the product can be used
for substantial commercial noninfringing use, and further, that evidence that it was
merely capable of this type of use was sufficient.120 The Court, using a survey showing
how the Betamax was used by several hundred owners, showed that in all of the taping
done by Sony’s customers, only a small percentage was deemed to be “authorized,” in
that it was not objected to by producers and distributors.121 The Court determined that
this volume of authorized duplication was significant enough to merit a determination of
substantial noninfringing use of the VCR.122
¶30
When considered against the analysis and evidence in Sony, Grokster’s product
passes the test of being capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
use. The expert for the copyright holders in Grokster III declared that 15% of the files
available on Grokster were “likely infringing” and that 75% were infringing.123 By
plaintiff’s calculations, this left approximately 10% of files that were seemingly
noninfringing, a figure analogous to the amount of authorized “time-shifting” uses of the
VCR, noted in Sony. As in Sony, witnesses described the noninfringing files on
Grokster’s server without detailed explanation.124 Those files included: “[a]uthorized
copies of music by artists such as Wilco, Janis Ian, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, and
others.”125 Additionally included were free electronic books and other works from
various online publishers, including Project Gutenberg;126 public domain and authorized
software such as WinZip 8.1;127 and licensed music videos and movie and television
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segments distributed via digital video packaging with the copyright holder’s
permission.128
¶31
The nature of these lawfully swapped files is such that it is reasonable to infer
quantities of lawful use roughly approximate to those at issue in Sony.129 Surely in
quantitative terms these uses only account for a small percentage of the total usage of
Grokster’s software. However, the same was true in Sony, which characterized the
relatively limited authorized copying market as “substantial.”130 Key to this comparative
analysis is that Sony used the word “capable” when describing commercially significant
non-infringing uses. This language suggests that a figure like the 10% seen in Grokster,
while miniscule, may allow for a future projection of expanded legitimate uses over time.
The record in Grokster revealed a “significant future market for noninfringing uses of
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software.”131 Thus it follows that the more uncopyrighted
material is stored in transferable form, the opportunity for lawful peer-to-peer sharing
will increase. Such legitimate noninfringing uses are developing to include the swapping
of:
research information (the initial purpose of many peer-to-peer networks);
public domain films (e.g. those owned by the Prelinger Archive);
historical recordings and digital educational materials (e.g. those stored
on the Internet Archive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example is a
peer-to-peer photo-swapping service); “shareware” and “freeware” (e.g.
Linux and certain Windows software); secured licensed music and movie
files (Internet MediaWorks, for example protects licensed content sent
across peer-to-peer networks); news broadcasts past and present (the BBC
Creative Archive lets users “rip, mix and share the BBC”); user-created
audio and video files (including “podcasts” that may be distributed though
peer-to-peer software); and all manner of free “open content” works
collected by Creative Commons . . . .132
¶32

This course of events should continue to flow naturally with the continued
development of information technology and the Internet. All of this information, taken
together is sufficient to meet the Sony standard.
¶33
The Sony standard should have been utilized in Grokster III for yet another
reason: it is protective of the development of technology. The Sony court wanted to
balance the rights of others to freely engage in new technology development and a
copyright holder’s reasonable demand for effective – not merely symbolic – protection.133
Sony’s rule as interpreted by the district court and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
128
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has provided entrepreneurs with needed reassurance that they will be shielded from
copyright liability when producing new technologies.
¶34
The key to the balance the Sony rule provides is its simplicity. This “user-friendly”
aspect allows those who develop new products that are capable of substantial
noninfringing use, to know in advance that they are not walking into a minefield of
copyright liability. While doing this, the doctrine also keeps out new technologies that
are created solely for the purpose of copyright infringement. It establishes that the law
will not impose this type of liability upon the distributors of technology capable of
infringing and noninfringing uses. The rule “deliberately makes it difficult for courts to
find secondary liability where new technology is at issue.”134 All of this is predicated, of
course, on the fact that the companies themselves do not participate in unauthorized
copying. By setting the standard in this way, Sony recognized that the point of copyright
law was to encourage the emergence of new technologies that efficiently disseminate
information, not to discourage innovation.135 “Thus Sony’s rule shelters VCRs,
typewriters, tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disk
burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer
software.”136
¶35
Some may argue that unauthorized copying depletes industry revenue, yet it is
unclear by how much. Researchers attempting to estimate just what level of difference
the peer-to-peer revolution has made on the industry range from claiming that the effect
is minimal, with little or no effect on album purchases,137 to the opposite end of the
spectrum, with record executives declaring losses in the billions.138 The effect on
production levels remains equally uncertain.139
V. CONCLUSION
¶36

Now that Sony is no longer standing precedent, how will the resultant potential for
stilted technological innovation affect the intellectual property legal community? Experts
in the field suspect that the decision “will have a chilling effect on the technology
industry” which may scare companies away from any new technology that involves the
Internet and digital content.140 The attorney who organized the defense effort in Grokster
and is the legal director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation warns that “such a ruling
could make copyright litigation much more complicated, since the Supreme Court spent a
lot of time analyzing evidence like internal e-mails from Grokster and StreamCast in
making its ruling.”141 Cohn went on to say that copyright litigation might become more
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like securities litigation in that discovery could include millions of emails as the litigants
look for an intent defining “smoking-gun message.”142
¶37
There is potential for access to every email and each design decision made.143
There is also concern that if peer-to-peer technology is going to continue to exist, many
companies may have to change their business models.144 This change may include the
use of digital rights management to either control the flow or filter out copyrighted
material on the Internet.145 Intellectual property and technology lawyers feel the ruling
will force them to rethink how they advise their clients who offer content on the Internet.
One intellectual property attorney has been quoted as saying, “at the most basic level,
anyone attempting to promote a [peer-to-peer] technology ought to make direct public
statements that the technology should not be used for infringement and to take down or
block materials known to be copyrighted.”146
¶38
Still there remains an insatiable need for digital content. Not unlike the “new”
Grokster, many companies are looking to put this ruling behind them and find new and
legal uses for peer-to-peer technology.147 “Lawful” music downloading services are those
that “charge the customer for downloading music and pay royalties to the copyright
holder.”148 New technology is now trending more toward discouraging unlawful copying
by making lawful copying cheaper and easier.149 Several music-downloading services
now sell music for less than one dollar per song.150 Another benefit of lawful swapping is
that many of the “unlawful” sites have technological problems.151 Thus this has caused a
migration of sorts to lawful paid services where there is an even greater flexibility and
convenience. In addition to legal music sites, many non-music peer-to-peer networks
have also begun to develop.152 Lastly, as Sony recognized, the legislative option remains
available.153 Courts are not as well suited as Congress to address the varied interests at
stake with this new technology.
¶39
While new developments, and similar alternatives, are positive, it remains to be
seen whether a reevaluation of Sony will be necessary in the near future. The risks to the
future of technology have been discussed as well as possible effects on intellectual
property and technology law. As it stands today, a strong demand for revision has not
been shown. This, coupled with the risks that strict interpretation of the Grokster III
decision would impose on technological innovation, leads to the conclusion that the Sony
doctrine should continue to be interpreted in its original form.
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